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PEOPLE V. PA YNE AND THE PROSECUTION'S
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: WILL
THEY BE PREEMPTED?
On the night of July 23, 1978, Frederick Perry, a black. man, was shot
in an altercation at a local park. ' A jury of eleven whites and one black
convicted Stanley Payne, another black man, of three counts of aggravated
battery and one count of armed violence.' During voir dire, 3 the prosecution exercised eight peremptory challenges.' Six were used to exclude all but
one of the seven prospective black jurors who had been drawn from the
jury venire. 5 The defense objected after each prospective black juror was
excused, claiming that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges
systematically excluded those veniremen solely because they were black and,
consequently, deprived the defendant of his federal 6 and state7 constitutional
rights to a fair and impartial jury.' The judge overruled each objection,'
and ultimately Payne was convicted.
On appeal, in People v. Payne, the Third Division of the First District
of the Illinois Appellate Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment right'"
to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is violated when the prosecution excludes discrete grou~s from the
1. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046
(1st Dist. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Appellant].
2. Appellant, supra note 1, at 7.
3. Voir dire is the preliminary questioning of prospective jurors by either the court or
counsel in order to determine the competency and potential partiality of individual jurors. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BLACK'S].
4. People v. Payne, 106 111.App. 3d 1034, 1044, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 (lst Dist. 1982).
The jury selection procedure generally involves compiling a list of potential jurors from the
eligible population. This list is then reduced by eliminating those individuals who lack minimum
qualifications (e.g., age, residency, health), are exempt from jury service by statute, or are
excused for various hardship reasons. Jury panels or "venires" are selected from those peopli
remaining on the list. During voir dire examination, attorneys dismiss prospective jurors for
cause or by exercising their peremptory challenges. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §§ 1-36 (1981)
(statutes governing jury selection procedures and challenges for cause); see also ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (1981) (statute governing peremptory challenges).
5. Brief for Appellee at 7, People v. Payne, 106 111.App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1st
Dist. 1982). After exercising its peremptory challenges, the prosecution allowed the last black
on the panel to be seated as a juror. 106 II1. App. 3d at 1044, 436 N.E.2d at 1054.
6. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury..
U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
7. The Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
8. Appellant, supra note 1, at 7.
9. 106 I11. App. 3d at 1044, 436 N.E.2d at 1054.
10. See supra note 6.
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petit jury' through the exercise of peremptory challenges which are based
on an assumption of group bias. 2 In its attempt to ensure a cross-sectional
petit jury, however, the Payne court failed to articulate a clear standard
for limiting the use of peremptory challenges. Thus, Payne has created a
procedural uncertainty which might hinder the efforts of counsel to obtain
an impartial jury. Moreover, the decision will hamper the prosecution's use
of peremptory challenges.
BACKGROUND

Fourteenth Amendment Challenges to Discriminatory Jury Selection
The United States Supreme Court first considered fourteenth amendment
challenges to jury selection procedures in a trilogy of cases decided in 1880.'"
In upholding defendants' claims of equal protection violations, the Court
observed that the exclusion of blacks from jury service not only injured the
defendants, but also denied a class of potential jurors the "privilege of participating . . . in the administration of justice,"'" and imposed on that class
the stigma of being unfit for jury service. While defendants have no right
5
to demand that members of their race be included on the jury,' the Court
held, states are prohibited from systematically denying members of defendants' race the right to participate as jurors."
Although it recognized the validity of defendants' fourteenth amendment
challenges to jury selection procedures, the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis imposed upon them a difficult burden of proof. First, defendants were required to establish that the excluded group was recognized as
7
a distinct class and constituted a substantial segment of the population.'
11. The petit jury is that jury which is used in the trial of a civil or criminal action. The
petit jury functions as the finder of fact and determines guilt or innocence. It is to be distinguished
from the grand jury which is an accusatory body that determines whether there is probable
cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether an indictment should be granted.
See BLACK'S, supra note 3, at 768.
12. 106 11. App. 3d at 1036-37, 436 N.E.2d at 1048. Group bias is the general prejudice
a prospective juror may harbor merely because of his particular societal associations. In contrast, specific bias is that bias which a prospective juror may have concerning the particular
case on trial, the witnesses, or the parties. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 274-76,
583 P.2d 748, 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 901-02 (1978).
13. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See generally Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880) (exclusion of blacks from petit jury panel violates right to equal protection).
14. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. at 308.
15. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. at 323.
16. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346-49.
17. See Theil v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (concept of distinct class
may include "economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community"). Although factors used to determine a cognizable group are vague, some of the standards employed include the following: whether the persons "have a different outlook
psychologically and economically. . . . a different social outlook . . .. a different sense of
...Id. at 230 (Frankfurter,
justice, and a different conception of a juror's responsibility.
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Second, in order to have standing, defendants had to be members of the
excluded group.18 In addition, they had to show that members of the group
were qualified for jury service.' 9 Finally, defendants had to demonstrate,
with convincing evidence, a pattern of group exclusions which revealed that
the selection procedures were implemented purposely to produce the
exclusions.2" The only objective evidence available to establish systematic
J., dissenting). The Court has applied this analysis to many groups. See, e.g., Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexicans are a cognizable group); Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 217 (1946) (lower socio-economic class status constitutes a cognizable group); see also
Rubio v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d 93, 98, 593 P.2d 595, 598-99, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737-38
(1979) (ex-felons and resident aliens are not cognizable groups because other members of the
community are capable of representing these groups' perspectives on the petit jury).
18. Although not explicitly stating that a defendant must be a member of the class excluded
from the jury in order to have standing, the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879), implied such a requirement by phrasing the issue before it as "whether, in the composition or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race
or color may be excluded by law ..
" Id. at 305 (emphasis added). Similarly, in holding
that the application of Delaware's statutory qualifications for jury service unconstitutionally
excluded blacks, the Court in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), stated that "while a
colored citizen . . . cannot claim, as a matter of right, that his race shall have a representation
on the jury . . . he is entitled, 'that in the selection of jurors . . . there shall be no exclusion
of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of their color.' " Id. at 394 (emphasis
added) (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323 (1879)). Accordingly, a case involving
an equal protection challenge to a petit jury's composition consists of a defendant of a particular class alleging an unconstitutional exclusion of that class. See Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559 (1953) (selection of jurors from county tax returns in which names of whites were
printed on white tickets and names of blacks were printed on yellow tickets held to be a violation of equal protection); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 395 (1935) (per curiam) (black defendant demonstrated an unconstitutional exclusion of blacks from jury service). For a criticism
of those cases following the "same class" standing requirement, see Note, The Defendant's
Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal
Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 919-25 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Defendant's Challenge].
Finally, in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), the Supreme Court granted standing to a nongroup
member, but analyzed the claim under due process rather than equal protection. Id. at 504;
see also infra note 117; Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection ProceduresAfter Taylor
v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Daughtreyl.
19. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 597 (1935).
20. Defendants who challenge the jury selection process or the composition of the jury
pool must prove a discriminatory intent, and must demonstrate a substantial disparity between
the representation of the group in the jury pool and the group's representation in the total
population. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). The equal protection analysis
is the same whether a defendant challenges petit jury or grand jury venires. Furthermore, statistical
proof alone may be insufficient to establish a prima facie case. A defendant also must prove
that the actual selection procedures are not racially neutral. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625 (1972). For a discussion of Justice Jackson's view that there should be a distinction
between improper grand jury and petit jury selection methods, see Gibson, Racial Discrimination on Grand Juries, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 33-37 (1950). For a discussion regarding group
discrimination on the jury under a due process analysis, see generally Note, Defendant's Challenge,
supra note 18.
The extent of proof required to establish a prima facie case of purposeful exclusion varies
with the bases upon which the defendant rests the challenge. For example, in reviewing challenges
to source lists, the Supreme Court has held that no source which is inherently discriminatory
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underrepresentation of a group consisted of source lists and venire
compositions. 2' As a result, defendants' equal protection challenges of jury
compositions were limited to these early stages of jury selection.22 Once the
prima facie case was established, the state had to rebut the presumption

of unconstitutionality by showing that the exclusions were either nondiscriminatory or justified by a legitimate state interest. 3
Later, in Swain v. Alabama,"4 a defendant challenged the composition of
the petit jury that convicted him as being unrepresentative of the community due to the prosecution's exclusion of blacks through the exercise of its
peremptory challenges. 25 The standard formulated by the Court to deal with
such petit jury objections placed an even greater burden of proof on the
defendant than was required in the earlier equal protection challenges to
jury selection. The Swain Court required the defendant to show not only
that peremptory challenges were employed systematically to exclude blacks

over a period of time, but also that this exclusion resulted solely from the
may be used, and that the defendant need not establish a discriminatory intent. See Sims v.
Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (per curiam) (jury list including only 9.8% of county's blacks and
which was formed from a segregated county tax list showing that 24% of county's taxpayers
were blacks held unconstitutional); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (segregated tax
lists are prima facie proof of an unconstitutional jury selection). For a discussion of the inadequacies of various source lists, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 85-106 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as VAN DYKE]; Kairys, Kadane & Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness:A Mandate
for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776 passim (1977).
21. The venire is a group of prospective jurors, summoned to appear on a particular day,
from which the petit jury is selected. BLACK'S, supra note 3, at 1395. For a general discussion
of practices which result in underrepresentative juries and of suggested procedures for gathering evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion, see A. GINGER,
JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS §§ 3.29-3.36, 6.9-6.23 (Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
GINGER].
22. For purposes of discussion, the "early stages of jury selection" refers to those procedures used by the jury commissioner in compiling the general jury list and does not include
the processes of voir dire, challenging prospective jurors, and impaneling the jury.
23. Mere government assertions, however, that the excluded group was not qualified or
that there was no discriminatory intent are insufficient to rebut the defendant's prima facie
case. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584,
587 (1958); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 288-90 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463,
466-69 (1947); cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-65 (1961) (statute requiring women to register
with court clerk in order to qualify for jury duty served legitimate state interest in promoting
the integrity of the family).
24. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The defendant, a black man, was convicted by an all white jury
of raping a white woman. Id. at 203.
25. Id. at 209. Focusing on the prosecutor's trial tactics, the defendant in Swain contended
that purposeful systematic exclusion was demonstrated by the exclusion of the eight blacks
on the venire as well as by the state's consistent exercise of its peremptory challenges in criminal
trials so that no blacks had served on a petit jury in 15 years. Id. at 222-28. The Court
acknowledged that the Alabama jury selection system was imperfect, but held that such an
imperfection was not evidence of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 224. Even though no blacks
served on the jury that convicted Swain, eight blacks had appeared on the venire. Id. at 205.
The Court, accordingly, found that Alabama had not excluded blacks from participation in
the jury process. Id. at 206.
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prosecution's peremptory challenges.26 Thus, by requiring such a showing,

the Court effectively insulated the peremptory challenge from judicial
inquiry.27

In formulating its standard in Swain, the Supreme Court recognized that
to achieve the underlying purpose of peremptory challenges, they must be exercised without reason and without subjection to the court's control or inquiry.28
Peremptory challenges, according to Swain, were important in achieving an
26. Id. at 226-27. The Swain Court noted that unlike selection procedures which were controlled completely by the state, both prosecution and defense counsel participate in challenging
prospective jurors. Under an equal protection challenge to selection procedures, underrepresentation alone was sufficient to prove systematic discrimination, assuming the elements of a prima
facie case were established, and the absence of a compelling state justification. In contrast,
where defendants asserted that minorities were excluded from jury service because of the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges, proof of the underrepresentative nature of the
juries alone was insufficient. Rather, the Swain Court required defendants to demonstrate that
the underrepresentation resulted solely from the prosecution's exercise of its challenges, as well
as to show that no actions of the defense contributed to the lack of minority representation
on a particular petit jury. Id.
27. Commentators have maintained that by insulating the peremptory challenge from judicial
inquiry, the Swain Court placed a statutorily based right above the defendant's constitutional
right of equal protection. See Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv.
235, 287-88 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn); Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 554, 558, 569-70 (1977); Comment,
Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury,
52 VA. L. REv. 1157, 1164-65 (1966).
In fact, the vast majority of defendants attempting to meet the requirements of Swain have
failed. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1076 (5th Cir. 1977); State v. Williams, 535 S.W.2d 128, 129-30
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10, 16-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Commonwealth
v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 31-34, 438 A.2d 951, 954-56 (1981); State v. Raymond, R.I.
- 446 A.2d 743, 745 (1982); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 10-13, 286 N.W.2d 607, 609-12
(Ct. App. 1979). At least two defendants, however, have successfully maintained a Swain
challenge. See State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (prosecutor's consistent rejection of blacks by exercise of peremptory challenges established); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751 (La. 1979) (defendant established that in a series of cases the prosecutor's exercise of his
peremptory challenges consistently resulted in underrepresentation of blacks on the petit jury).
For a discussion of earlier cases in which blacks have been excluded from jury service through
the exercise of peremptory challenges, see VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 154-60.
28. 380 U.S. at 220. The Swain Court examined the common law history, nature, and function
of the peremptory challenge and concluded that it is "one of the most important of the rights
secured to the accused." Id. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
The Court added that:
[a]lthough historically the incidence of the prosecutor's challenge has differed from
that of the accused, the view in this country has been that the system should guarantee
"not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held."
Id. at 220 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court held that although peremptory challenges were
not constitutionally required, they were a fundamental element of the jury trial and should
be equally accessible to the defendant and to the state. Id. at 219-20. For an analysis of the
common law that differs from the Swain Court's interpretation, see GINGER, supra note 21,
at § 12.1; VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 145, 152.
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impartial jury because they enabled a party to excuse prospective jurors on
the basis of either a real or imagined subjective perception of bias which
ordinarily could not be established during voir dire. The Swain Court noted
that these perceptions frequently were based on considerations such as juror
appearance or demeanor, and characteristics such as religion, occupation,
race, and socio-economic background. 29 The Court noted that permitting
judicial inquiry into the reason for exercising a peremptory challenge would
radically alter the function and nature of the device.3" Therefore, even though
an individual prosecutor exercised his challenges to shape the racial composition of a single petit jury, his. peremptory challenges were not subject
to the requirements of equal protection. 3
Swain thus demonstrated the Court's fear that opening the peremptory
challenge to attack would undermine its function. The Court's endorsement
of the peremptory challenge acknowledged that racial factors were a legitimate
trial-related basis for exercising the peremptory challenge.32 Furthermore,
Swain recognized the impossibility of applying a traditional systematic exclusion analysis to the small number of individuals present on the venire
within a particular trial. 33
The Sixth Amendment and the Cross-Sectional Analysis
of Jury Selection Procedures
With the application of the sixth amendment to state criminal proceedings,34
challenges that jury selection procedures excluded societal groups from jury
service shifted from the purposeful systematic exclusion analysis of the fourteenth amendment to an analysis related to the fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment.33 In Taylor v. Louisiana,36 the Court held

29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21. The Court noted that unrestricted use of peremptory challenges
was important to enable attorneys to conduct a thorough voir dire, and establish challenges for
cause without fear of antagonizing jurors who ultimately sit on the petit jury. Id. at 219-20.
30. "To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature
and operation of the challenge." Id. at 221-22.
31. "In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves
. . . we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons
for the exercise of his challenges in any given case." Id.
32. The peremptory challenge frequently is exercised "on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation,
" Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
or affiliations of people ..
33. Id. at 221-22; see Note, ProsecutorialMisuse of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude
Discrete Groups from the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v. Soares, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1197, 1202-03
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Discrete Groups].
34. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (the right to a jury trial in criminal cases
involving serious penalties as guaranteed by the sixth amendment is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment).
35. For the relevant text of the sixth amendment, see supra note 6.
36. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The defendant challenged the validity of a state statute which
required women to file a written request with the court commissioner in order to be included
on the jury list. Id. at 523.
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that a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community was
an essential component of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
and impartial jury.37 The Taylor Court stressed that in order for the actual
jury to act as a community hedge against arbitrary and overzealous law enforcement, the jury pool must contain a broad "cross-section" of the
community. 8 This broad cross-section was necessary to guarantee the "subtle interplay" of influence between distinct groups. 39 The Court also noted
that total community participation in the administration of criminal justice
was required by this country's democratic heritage."0
Having found that the sixth amendment confers a right to a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community, the Taylor Court
declared that a defendant should have standing to challenge the composition of the jury pool, regardless of his relation to the excluded group. 4 ' The
cross-sectional analysis in Taylor placed the initial burden on the defendant
to prove a prima facie violation of his right to a representative cross-section.' 2
The elements of this prima facie showing were clearly delineated in Duren
3
v. Missouri.4
According to Duren, the defendant must demonstrate that a
"distinctive"

group"

in the community had been systematically' 5 under-

represented in the jury venires, and that the exclusion was inherent in the
jury selection process.'1 Upon demonstration of a prima facie case, the state

37. Id. at 530-31.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
40. Id. at 530.
41. Id. at 526.
42. Although it did not formulate any specific test for establishing a prima facie case, the
Taylor Court distinguished the burden of proving a violation under the sixth amendment crosssectional analysis from that required under the fourteenth amendment. The Court noted that
upon a demonstration that a distinctive class was excluded from jury service, "[tihe right to
a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds." Id. at 531-35.
43. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). The defendant challenged a Missouri statute which granted women
an automatic exemption upon request by asserting that the statute resulted in an unconstitutional underrepresentation of women on jury venires; thus, it violated his constitutional right
to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Id. at 360-62; see United States v.
Test, 550 F.2d 577, 585 (10th Cir. 1976) (pre-Duren case in which the court delineated similar
prima facie elements in establishing a violation of the Taylor fair cross-section standard).
44. The requirement that the group excluded be "distinct" was established in Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), in which the Court noted that race, color and various "other
differences from the community norm" define groups in need of equal protection. Id. at 478.
45. Under the Duren sixth amendment cross-sectional representation analysis, consistent
systematic exclusion must be demonstrated. 439 U.S. at 366.
46. Id.; see Finkelstein, The Application of StatisticalDecision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966) (use of mathematical analysis in determining the
probability that discriminatory systematic exclusion has occurred); Comment, The Civil Practitioner's Right to Representative Grand Juries and a Statistical Method of Showing Discrimination in Jury Selection Cases General, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1973) (discussing the proof
of substantial underrepresentation through use of statistical analysis). See generally NATIONAL
JURY PROJECT, THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE (Kairys ed. 1975)
(providing a comprehensive guide for the practicing attorney faced with having to demonstrate
systematic exclusion) [hereinafter cited as PROJECT].

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:399

had to justify the underrepresentation by showing the existence of a significant state interest which prevented compliance with the cross-sectional

representation requirement."
Initially, the Taylor-Duren analysis appears to be very similar to the equal

protection prima facie test used to establish a presumption of discrimination."
The principal distinction between the two approaches is in the manner in
which the prima facie case is rebutted. The presumption of discrimination

in an equal protection claim would be rebutted by proving the lack of
discriminatory intent. 9 In the Taylor-Duren fair cross-section analysis, purposeful discrimination is irrelevant because the emphasis is wholly on the
composition of the venire.30 Thus, the Taylor-Duren analysis significantly

decreased the burden of defendants who challenged jury selection procedures.
It must be noted, however, that the Taylor-Duren decisions are limited to
the early stages of jury selection. The Taylor Court specifically stated that
the actual petit juries need not reflect "various distinctive groups in the
population,"" and confined its holding to "jury wheels, pools of names,
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn." 2 By specifically limiting
the cross-sectional analysis under the sixth amendment to these stages of
jury selection, the Court did not directly overrule Swain since that case dealt
with the composition of the petit jury.
Although federal courts have expressed a disfavor for the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges, 3 the Swain holding has been followed
47. 439 U.S. at 368. The Court acknowledged the state's interest in assuring that family
members responsible for the care of children should not be burdened with jury duty. By excluding all women as a group to accomplish this interest, however, the state engaged in overinclusive categorization. Id. at 370.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18. In his dissent in Duren, Justice Rehnquist
attacked the majority's cross-sectional approach as being nothing but a revived equal protection analysis which would cause confusion in state legislatures. He reasoned that judicial application of these apparently interchangable analyses would result in inconsistent decisions regarding the constitutionality of statutes regulating jury selection procedures. Justice Rehnquist concluded that this inconsistency would confuse legislators as they attempted to effectuate valid
state interests through the provision of exemptions for particular groups of individuals. Id.
at 371-78. Compare Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (a statute requiring women to register
with court clerk in order to qualify for jury service was a reasonable means to effectuate the
state's interest under an equal protection analysis) with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (a
statute similar to the one in Hoyt was held to be a violation of the sixth amendment's crosssectional representation requirement).
49. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 48; see also United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1384
n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (distinction between fair cross-section rebuttal analysis and equal protection rebuttal analysis).
51. 419 U.S. at 538.
52. Id.
53. Two federal courts have used their supervisory powers to remedy prosecutorial abuse
of peremptory challenges. In United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974),
despite a finding that the Swain standard had not been met, the court relied on Rule 33 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to grant the defendant a new trial in the interest
of justice, because blacks had been underrepresented in the venire and the prosecution had exer-
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consistently. 4 Additionally, no attempt has been made by federal courts to
extend the Taylor rationale to the petit jury selection stage.55 Two state
supreme courts, however, examining Taylor in conjunction with their state
constitutional guarantees, have extended Taylor to the petit jury in fashioning a remedy for alleged prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges. 6

cised peremptory challenges against six of the seven prospective black jurors. Id. at 1248-50.
The court in United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), disallowed the
prosecution's peremptory challenges. The Robinson court ordered the United States Attorney's
office to maintain records of the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks
for the purpose of using the data to assist future defendants who assert a Swain challenge.
The Second Circuit, however, vacated Robinson in United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240
(2d Cir. 1977), holding that the Robinson court based its order on an erroneous finding of
fact. See generally Note, Exclusion of Black Venire-Men Through Use of Prosecution'sPeremptory Challenges Held to Be in Violation of Equal Protection Clause, 8 CuM. L. REV. 307 (1977)
(detailed analysis of Robinson and Newman).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1980) (an all white jury resulting
from the state's peremptory challenges was not systematic exclusion); United States v. Durham,
587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979) (the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges in the
context of a single case, such that the defendant is tried by an all white jury, does not constitute systematic exclusion); United States v. McLauren, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977) (peremptory challenges by the prosecution against five of the six blacks on the venire does not constitute systematic exclusion in the context of a single case), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978);
United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding evidence of systematic exclusion
insufficient, but viewing the allegations against the prosecutor seriously and authorizing the
lower courts to act if the statistics indicate such allegations are valid), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
922 (1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding systematic exclusion,
but warning prosecutors that action would be taken should abuse continue), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Conley, 503 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1974) (a low percentage of
blacks in general population which results in representation on venires which the prosecution
can eliminate through its peremptory challenges does not preclude an impartial jury); United
States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1972) (trial by an all white jury resulting from state's
exercise of its peremptory challenges does not violate equal protection); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971) (the exclusion of blacks from a jury in a single case does
not constitute systematic exclusion).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1981) (when venire contains young
adults, Taylor does not require that they appear on the petit jury), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
948 (1982); Smith v. Balckom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (Taylor does not require representation on the petit jury of individuals opposed to the death penalty); United States v. Yazzie,
660 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1981) (underrepresentation of Indians on a petit jury is not a violation
of the Taylor cross-sectional representation requirement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982).
56. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). For
examples of lower state court rulings extending the Taylor rationale to both the petit jury and
the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges, see People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d
87, 106-08, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 752-54 (1981); People v. Boone, 107 Misc. 2d 301, 304-05, 433
N.Y.S.2d 955, 957-58 (1980); People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 276-77, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987,
989 (1979). In Kagan, systematic exclusion of a defendant's ethnic group was held unconstitutional; however, in the instant case the court found insufficient evidence of such systematic
exclusion. 101 Misc. 2d at 278, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 990. Most courts, however, have declined
to control the prosecution's peremptory challenges in the context of a single trial by following
the Wheeler-Soares extension of the Taylor cross-section rationale to the petit jury. See, e.g.,
McCray v. State, 395 So.2d 1057, 1059-60 (Ala. Ct. App. 1980); Doepel v. United States,
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The Expansion of Taylor in the State Courts
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Wheeler," held that the state's
constitution" prohibited the elimination of cognizable groups from the petit
jury through the use of peremptory challenges. 59 In justifying its conclusion, the Wheeler court equated Taylor's requirement, that venires be
representative of a community cross-section, with impartiality of the petit
jury. The court reasoned that within the petit jury each individual possesses
opinions which result from his association, or lack of association, with a
particular societal subgroup." These shared experiences produced common
perspectives which were identified in Wheeler as group bias. 6 ' Overall

impartiality of the petit jury can only be secured by the interaction of diverse
beliefs and values among the jurors." Through the exercise of peremptory
challenges, prospective jurors could be excluded on the basis of their member-

ship in a particular subgroup, resulting in a jury dominated by majoritarian

prejudices. 3 Accordingly, the court ruled that peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of group bias conflicted with the purpose of a crosssectional rule, and violated the defendant's state constitutional right to an

impartial jury.6 '
Although it acknowledged the vitality of Swain, the Wheeler court declared
434 A.2d 449, 457-59 (D.C.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981); State v. Stewart, 225 Kan.
410, 415-17, 591 P.2d 166, 170-72 (1979); Lawrence v. State, 51 Md. App. 575, 584, 444 A.2d
478, 483 (1982); State v. Sims, 639 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. McCray,
57 N.Y.2d 542, 549, 443 N.E.2d 915, 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2438 (1983); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 31-34, 438 A.2d 951, 954-56
(1981); State v. Raymond, R.1. -,
-,
446 A.2d 743, 745 (1982); State v. Grady, 93 Wis.
2d 1, 10-13, 286 N.W.2d 607, 609-12 (1979).
57. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
58. The California Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Trial by jury is an inviolate
right and shall be secured to all...."
CAL. CONST. art. I § 16.
59. 22 Cal. 3d at 277, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
60. Id. at 271-73, 583 P.2d at 757-59, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 898-901.
61. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. For a detailed analysis of group
attributes and opinions, see VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 23-44. See also supra note 12.
62. 22 Cal. 3d at 266-67, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896. The dissent rejected
this contention, stating:
Impartiality is not assured by balancing "biases." Quite the opposite. Such disagreement may indicate that individual prejudices so control the jurors that they are
incapable of viewing the issues before them dispassionately. Such disharmony may
make a unanimous verdict an impossibility from the outset thus rendering the criminal
trial a futile exercise.
Id. at 292, 583 P.2d at 771-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (Richardson, J., dissenting). For a discussion which disputes equating cross-sectional representation with jury impartiality, see Note,
Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 passim (1980).
63. 22 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
64. Id. The Wheeler court, while reading the Taylor requirement of a cross-sectional venire
as mandating the same requirement for petit juries, noted the divergence between its interpretation of Taylor and the Supreme Court's holding in Swain. The court evaded the apparent
conflict in the federal law by basing its decision on state constitutional guarantees as independent grounds and noting that "our first referent is California law and divergent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court are to be followed . . . only when they provide no less pro-
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that Swain failed to protect defendants' right to an impartial jury.6" Because
in interpreting its constitution, a state court may grant its citizens greater
rights than are available under the federal constitution, 6 the Wheeler court
rejected the Swain rule and held that in California 7 a defendant was "entitled
to a petit jury that [was] as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section
1 8
of the community as the process of random draw permit[ted]."

1

An identical approach towards peremptory challenges was adopted by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Soares6 9 Relying on its
Declaration of Rights,7 0 the Soares court held that it was forbidden to use
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors who are members of
"discrete" groups solely on the basis of their group membership.7" Like
Wheeler, the Soares court believed that more than a representative venire
was necessary to achieve the desired interaction of a cross-section of the
community;" such interaction was achieved only through deliberations within
the jury room.3 While supporting the Wheeler distinction between group
and specific bias, the court rejected the use of a prospective juror's group
bias as a basis for predicting potential juror impartiality. 7"
Wheeler and Soares adopted essentially the same procedure to identify and
remedy an unlawful use of peremptory challenges. Both courts placed the
initial burden on the party alleging the unlawful exclusion. 5 To overcome
a rebuttable presumption at trial that the peremptory challenges were being
exercised constitutionally, the challenging party must establish that the persons excluded were members of a "discrete" or "cognizable" group, and
tection than is guaranteed by California law." Id. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 907-08.
65. Id. at 284-87, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09. The Wheeler court noted
that even though Swain was decided on the basis of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court's concern with altering the basic nature of the peremptory challenge would prevail under
a sixth amendment analysis. Accordingly, the California court did not distinguish Swain on
the ground that the sixth amendment had become applicable to state criminal proceedings.
Id. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
66. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (a state, acting under
its sovereign right, can adopt in its own constitution more expansive individual liberties than
those guaranteed by the federal Constitution).
67. 22 Cal. 3d at 287, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
68. Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
69. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). The prosecution eliminated 12 of the 13 blacks
on the venire by exercising its peremptory challenges. Id. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
70. Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution states in pertinent part: "And no subject
shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges
.. . but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." MAss. CoNsT. Pt. 1, art. 12.
71. 377 Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
72. Id. at 482-83, 387 N.E.2d at 513.
73. Id. at 480-83, 387 N.E.2d at 512-13. The Soares court cautioned that its holding did
not require proportional representation of every group on every petit jury; such a requirement
would not be administratively feasible. Id. at 481-82, 387 N.E.2d at 512-13.
74. Id. at 485-87, 387 N.E.2d at 514-15.
75. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-82, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06; Soares, 377
Mass. at 489-91, 387 N.E.2d at 516-17.

410

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:399

that there was a likelihood that such persons were challenged solely because
of their group associations. 7" Provided that such exclusion is demonstrated,
the other party then has the burden of justifying its peremptory challenges
with reasons other than group bias. If that party fails to justify the use
of its peremptory challenges, the judge must excuse the remaining venire,
as well as the jurors already seated, and renew the jury selection process."
Prior to People v. Payne, 8 Illinois had not adopted the position taken
by the Massachusetts and California courts, even though several defendants
had raised the issue of prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges. These
defendants either attempted to meet the burdensome task of satisfying Swain,
or urged the courts to adopt an interpretation of article I, section 8 of the
Illinois Constitution 9 similar to that adopted in Wheeler and Soares10 Neither
76. The standard established by the Wheeler court was that "from all the circumstances
of the case [the defendant] must show a strong likelihood that such persons [were] being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias." 22 Cal.
3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (emphasis added). In comparison, the standard enunciated in Soares was based upon the "likelihood [that blacks were] being excluded
from the jury solely by reason of their group membership." 377 Mass. at 490, 387 N.E.2d
at 517 (emphasis added). Given the different phraseology employed by the two courts, and
the fact that one black did sit on the petit jury in Soares, it appears that the Massachusetts
Supreme Court intended to require a lesser burden for the defendant to establish an unconstitutional use of the peremptory challenge. Compare People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526,
179 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1982) (prosecution's exercise of two peremptory challenges to exclude the
only two blacks on the venire does not violate the Wheeler standard) with Commonwealth
v. DiMatteo, 81 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1777, 427 N.E.2d 754 (1981) (defense counsel's
exercise of one of his peremptory challenges to exclude the only black on the venire violates
the Soares standard).
77. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282, 583 P.2d at 756, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906; Soares, 377 Mass.
at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517-18.
78. 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1st Dist. 1982).
79. See supra note 7.
80. Six years before Swain, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the peremptory challenge
was a substantial right which could be exercised according to the "judgment, will, or caprice"
of the prosecution without assigning a reason. People v. Harris, 17 Ill. 2d 446, 451, 161 N.E.2d
809, 811 (1959). Since no blacks were excluded from the venire, the Harris court held that
the resultant exclusion of blacks from the petit jury, through the use of peremptory challenges,
did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights. Id. at 450-51, 161 N.E.2d at 811-12.
Similarly, in People v. Butler, 46 Ill. 2d 162, 263 N.E.2d 89 (1970), the court, applying Swain,
held that where blacks constituted 12% of the total population, the state did not act unconstitutionally by exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude the only black on the venire. Id.
at 165, 263 N.E.2d at 91. More recently, in People v. Gaines, 88 Ill. 2d 342, 430 N.E.2d
1046 (1981), the defendant's failure to make a timely objection and to establish a sufficient
record to meet either the Wheeler-Soares or Swain standard, resulted in the court's refusal
to decide whether it should overrule Harris and adopt the Wheeler-Soares approach. Id. at
358-59, 430 N.E.2d at 1054. For examples of Illinois Supreme Court rulings reiterating the
view that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in a single case is not subject to inquiry, see People v. King, 54 Ill. 2d 291, 298, 296 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1973); People v. Powell,
53 111.2d 465, 477-78, 292 N.E.2d 409, 416-17 (1973); People v. Dukes, 19 111.2d 532, 540,
169 N.E.2d 84, 88 (1960).
The Illinois appellate courts also have been reluctant to adopt the Wheeler-Soares standard.
In People v. Smith, 91 Ill. App. 3d 523, 414 N.E.2d 1117 (1st Dist. 1980), the prosecutor
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of these approaches was successful.'
THE PA YNE DECISION
The Payne court, echoing the reasoning of Wheeler and Soares, focused
on the roles of the state, the prosecution, and the courts in a criminal

proceeding. 82 Although the defendant asserted both federal and state constitutional grounds on appeal,83 the court based its decision on the defendant's right to an impartial jury as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of
the federal Constitution."
Examining the roles of the parties involved, the Payne court ruled that
any discriminatory action taken by the prosecutor was imputed to the state. 5

exercised four peremptory challenges to exclude nonwhites from the jury. Although the court
criticized the use of peremptory challenges to strike blacks, the record was insufficient to meet
either the Wheeler-Soares or Swain standard. The Smith court, however, indicated that given
the opportunity it would adopt the Wheeler-Soares standard. Id. at 532, 414 N.E.2d at 1124.
Nevertheless, in People v. Lavinder, 102 II. App. 3d 662, 430 N.E.2d 243 (lst Dist. 1981),
the same court was given the opportunity to adopt Wheeler-Soares, but rejected the contention
that achieving cross-sectional representation by placing limitations on the peremptory challenge
would insure an impartial jury and held that Swain was dispositive of the issue. Id. at 667,
430 N.E.2d at 1246.
The division of the appellate court that decided Payne has followed its decision in subsequent cases. See People v. Gilliard, 112 Ill.
App. 3d 799, 445 N.E.2d 1293 (1st Dist. 1983);
People v. Gosberry, 109 III. App. 3d 674, 440 N.E.2d 954 (1st Dist. 1982). Two other divisions
of the First District have considered Payne and, declining to review the exercise of peremptory
challenges in a single case, they have held that it is not within the court's province to establish
a rule which emasculates the function of the challenge. See People v. Newsome, 110 11. App.
3d 1043, 443 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1982); People v. Teague, 108 111.App. 3d 891, 438 N.E.2d
1066 (1st Dist. 1982). The Second and Third Districts also have considered Payne and rejected
its rationale. See People v. Osborn, Ill Ill. App. 3d 1078, 444 N.E.2d 1158 (3d Dist. 1983);
People v. Baylor, 1l1 I1I. App. 3d 286, 443 N.E.2d 1137 (2d Dist. 1982).
81. See, e.g., People v. Belton, 105 11. App. 3d 10, 433 N.E.2d 1119 (1st Dist. 1982) (the
exclusion of seven members of minority groups through the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges was held to be an insufficient demonstration of systematic exclusion); People v.
Mims, 103 Ill.
App. 3d 673, 431 N.E.2d 1126 (1st Dist. 1981) (a showing that six blacks were
App. 3d
struck was insufficient proof of systematic exclusion); People v. Clearlee, 101 Ill.
16, 427 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1981) (striking of nine blacks was not systematic exclusion);
People v. Vaughn, 100 11. App. 3d 1082, 427 N.E.2d 840 (1st Dist. 1981) (striking of three
App.
blacks held to be insufficient for either Swain or Wheeler); People v. Tucker, 99 Ill.
3d 606, 425 N.E.2d 511 (2d Dist. 1981) (the defendant waived his right to assert the issue
App. 3d
because he neither objected to nor made a post-trial motion); People v. Allen, 96 Ill.
871, 422 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1981) (disapproving of use of peremptory challenges to exclude
blacks but rejecting Wheeler as contrary to existing precedent).
82. 106 11. App. 3d at 1035-38, 436 N.E.2d at 1047-49.
83. See Appellant, supra note 1, at 2, 18.
84. 106 11. App. 3d at 1035-36, 436 N.E.2d at 1047-48. The Payne court's reliance on
the sixth amendment, as the basis for its decision, must be contrasted with the analysis used
by the courts in Wheeler and Soares. Both of these courts based their decisions on their respective state constitutional guarantees to a jury trial. See supra notes 59, 65, 66, 70 and accompanying text.
85. 106 11. App. 3d at 1035, 436 N.E.2d at 1047. The Payne court declared that "[ilt
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The issue, therefore, was whether the state, acting through its prosecutors,
could exclude blacks from the jury. Such acts by the state were held to be
repugnant to the defendant's sixth amendment rights.8"
Turning to the roles of the prosecutor and the courts, the Payne court
stated that the prosecution's primary function was to seek justice, not to
accumulate convictions.87 The court believed that whenever the prosecutor
systematically excluded blacks from the petit jury solely on the basis of
race, he was not seeking justice; rather, he was seeking convictions.88 Furthermore, Payne determined that a criminal trial was an open theater in
which society witnessed a system of justice. 9 Since "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice," when society viewed a prosecutor systematically excluding one race from the jury, there clearly was no appearance of justice.90
The Payne court then examined whether the cross-sectional requirement
of the sixth amendment should apply to the petit jury. The court reasoned
that only by prohibiting discrimination in the selection of the jury venire
could exclusion of a group from the petit jury be prevented." However, the
goals of community participation and social interaction on the petit jury,
which are requisite for impartiality, are not achieved by the mere presence
of a group on the venire. 2 Systematic exclusion, therefore, is invidious at
any stage of the jury selection process. 3 In order to secure public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system, and to insure that the jury
functions as a guard against oppressive, arbitrary law enforcement, community participation on the petit jury must be guaranteed.' This guarantee,
the court reasoned, does not exist when segments of the population are
excluded by the prosecution's peremptory challenges. 5
Dismissing the state's argument that peremptory challenges are not subject to judicial inquiry, 96 the court maintained that the law had been changed

is not just the individual officer or attorney who is racially discriminating against the accused,
but rather the State itself." Id.
86. Id. at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048-49. Citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE PROCECUTION FUNCTION §

1.1(c)

(1974) and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-13 (1979), the court stated that excluding blacks from the jury solely because of race
not only violated the defendant's constitutional rights, but also constituted a clear violation
of the attorney's professional responsibility.
87. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048; see also Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (the prosecution's duty is to seek justice).
88. 106 I1. App. 3d 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048; see supra note 87.
89. 106 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 436 N.E.2d at 1049.
90. Id.(quoting Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960)).
91. Id.at 1036, 436 N.E.2d at 1048.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 1036-37, 436 N.E.2d at 1048.
94. Id.at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048-49.
95. Id.at 1037-38, 436 N.E.2d at 1049.
96. Id.at 1043-44, 436 N.E.2d at 1052-53. The state asserted that the Supreme Court, in
Swain, held that the essential nature of the peremptory challenge was that it was never subject
to judicial control. Id.at 1043, 436 N.E.2d at 1052-53. Furthermore, the state argued that
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significantly by the incorporation of the sixth amendment guarantee of an
impartial jury97 drawn from a cross-section of the community.98 Accordingly,

the Swain decision, which was based solely on an equal protection analysis,99
was not dispositive in evaluating the effect of peremptory challenges on defendants' sixth amendment rights. Swain indicated that peremptory challenges

may be subject to judicial inquiry when they are used to violate a defendant's constitutional rights. Consequently, the Payne court maintained that

the imposition of a similar inquiry in a sixth amendment context would not
00
expand existing constitutional limitations on the use of these challenges.'
The Payne court declared that prior Illinois decisions were inapplicable

because those cases either relied on a Swain equal protection analysis, or
were based on an insufficient record-neither of which was present in Payne.'°'
The court found that the peremptory challenge was a statutorily based right
which was neither part of Illinois common law' 2 nor constitutionally
required.' 3 Payne held that the statute granting peremptory challenges,
although constitutional on its face, was unconstitutional in its application
when peremptory challenges were used to exclude blacks systematically from
the petit jury. ' Accordingly, the court concluded, the statutory right must
be subordinated to defendants' constitutional right.
because Swain established a presumption that the prosecution was exercising its challenges for
appropriate reasons, it followed that "peremptory challenges are without exception insulated
from inquiry in each case ..
" Id. at 1043, 436 N.E.2d at 1053 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 1041-42, 436 N.E.2d at 1051-52; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to jury trial applies to state criminal proceedings involving serious sanctions).
98. 106 II1. App. 3d at 1041-42, 436 N.E.2d at 1051-52; see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975) (sixth amendment requires cross-sectionally representative venires).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26; cf. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 284-85,
585 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09 (1978) (rejecting the proposition that Taylor has
changed the law regarding peremptory challenges as established in Swain).
100. 106 111.App. 3d at 1042-43, 436 N.E.2d at 1053. While holding that the exercise of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks solely on the basis of race was permissible within the
context of a single case, the Supreme Court, in Swain, noted that when the state "in case
after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime, and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes . . . with the result that no Negroes
ever serve on petit juries," then the peremptory challenge may be subject to judicial control.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 223; see infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
101. 106 I11. App. 3d at 1043-44, 436 N.E.2d at 1053; see cases cited supra note 81.
102. 106 I11.App. 3d at 1039, 436 N.E.2d at 1049. The court noted that in 1305, Parliament
abolished the Crown's rights to peremptory challenges. Id. at 1039 n.4, 436 N.E.2d at 1050
n.4. Illinois adopted as its common law the laws of England as they existed in 1607. Id.; see
Hardesty v. Mitchell, 302 I11.369, 371, 134 N.E. 745, 746 (1922); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1, § 801
(1981). Since the government had no right to peremptory challenges in 1607, the court
concluded that the state's right to peremptory challenges did not exist in the common law
of Illinois. 106 I11. App. 3d at 1039, 436 N.E.2d at 1049-50; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 243 n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
103. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 436 N.E.2d at 1049 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S.
583, 586 (1919)) (peremptory challenges are a statutorily granted right and not constitutionally
required); see also Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.ll (1948) (quoting Stilson).
104. 106 I11. App. 3d at 1039, 436 N.E.2d at 1049 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.
3d at 281 n.28, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.28).
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Holding that the state could not attempt to do during voir dire what it
was precluded from doing at the venire stage of jury selection, the Payne
court limited the application of its ruling solely to the prosecution.' 5 The
court further asserted that the right to a fair cross-section was not limited
to the presence of racial minorities on the petit jury, but that it included
"any discrete group."" 6 While emphasizing that the defendant was not entitled to have every community group proportionately represented on the
petit jury, the Payne court maintained that the defendant was "constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that [was] as nearan approximation of the
ideal cross-section .. .as the process of random draw and constitutionally
acceptable procedures permit."' 07 The state, therefore, could not affirmatively
frustrate this constitutional right by excluding "discrete" groups through the
use of peremptory challenges.
Having defined the purpose and scope of group interaction on the petit
jury, as well as the function of peremptory challenges, the Payne court
established a liberal procedure for demonstrating systematic exclusion. The
procedure was designed to preclude the use of peremptory challenges based
on group affiliation, but not inhibit their legitimate function of eliminating
individual bias on the petit jury.0 8 Although the state was presumed to be

105. Id. at 1037, 1039, 436 N.E.2d at 1048, 1049. The Payne court asserted that it was
the state, acting through its prosecutors, that was excluding blacks discriminatorily. Accordingly,
the Payne court phrased the issue as "whether the State itself can so exclude Blacks,"
and held that it could not. Id. at 1035, 436 N.E.2d at 1047. Implicit in this holding is the
notion that the state, unlike the defendant, is not entitled to any of the protections afforded
to defendants by the Bill of Rights. Therefore, a court can curtail the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges while not similarly limitating the defendant's challenges. See Carey, Some
Thoughts on People v. Payne: Arguments in Support of Payne, 13 ILL. CTs. BULL. JUD. AD.
(Ill. St. B.A.) No. 2, at 7 (Aug. 1982) (Payne limitation on the prosecution's peremptory
challenges, while not imposing similar limitations on the defendant's challenges, is constitutionally
justified); Waltz, Now It's Harderfor Lawyers to Pick Biased Jury, Chicago Sun-Times, July
13, 1982, at 30, col. 1 (Payne ruling is the only practical means of preserving defendant's
right to impartial jury) [hereinafter cited as Waltz]; cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
36 (1964) ("the Government, as litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which
it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards
as most likely to produce a fair result."); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (when
the legislature grants the prosecution and the defendants the privilege of peremptory challenges,
that right is to be equally accessible to both parties).
106. 106 IIl. App. 3d at 1037 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 1048 n.2; cf. Commonwealth v. Soares,
377 Mass. 461, 488-89, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (1979) (limiting its holding to sex, race, color,
creed, or national origin).
107. 106 Il1. App. 3d at 1037, 436 N.E.2d at 1048.
108. Id. at 1036, 436 N.E.2d at 1047-48 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975)).
See generally Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1770 (1979) (sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement
is an inappropriate method of controlling abuse; the focus should be on the goal of increasing
community participation on the petit jury in general) [hereinafter cited as Note, Misuse]; Note,
Impartial Jury-Restricting the Peremptory Challenge, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1084 (1979)
(presenting a critical analysis of Wheeler and Soares, but concluding that the standard was the
only practical means of remedying the problem). For a comprehensive assessment of the cross-
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exercising its challenges constitutionally, that presumption was inapplicable,
upon a motion by the defendant or the court acting on its own observations, where it reasonably appeared that the prosecution was using its
challenges to exclude certain discrete groups."9 Accordingly, the court could
require the prosecution to demonstrate that it was exercising its challenges
for reasons other than group bias."' Nevertheless, Payne failed to delineate
any criteria to be considered by the judge in ruling on such objections."'
Instead, the court expressed confidence in the trial judge's ability to determine when systematic exclusion arose, and to distinguish valid from invalid
justifications for peremptory challenges. ' "
Adopting the Wheeler-Soares approach, the Payne court held that when
the trial judge finds that the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges
has improperly excluded a discrete group, the jurors already seated and any
jurors remaining on the venire must be excused.'" Upon such dismissal, a
different venire must be drawn and a new jury selected."" Thus, by imposing
this standard, the Paine court hoped to guarantee that the jury was, in fact,
impartial and representative of the community's sense of justice.'' 5
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

The Payne court, relying foremost on the defendant's sixth amendment
rights under the federal Constitution, based its decision on a questionable
reading of federal precedent.'" In its attempt to fashion a rule that would
insure community participation in the jury system, Payne failed to distinguish
between the federal constitutional limitations on state administered selection
sectional requirement and its effect on selection procedures in the Fifth Circuit, see Daughtrey,
supra note 18, passim.
109. 106 Ill.
App. 3d at 1039-40, 436 N.E.2d at 1049-50. The Payne court stated that "[olnce
it reasonably appears to the trial court that the accused is being affirmatively denied an impartial jury . . . there is no reason to presume that the State is not affirmatively violating the
accused's constitutional entitlement." Id. at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
110. Id.
111. Id. But see People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 905. Some relevant factors proposed by the Wheeler court were the following: the party
struck all or most of the cognizable group from the venire; the party exercised a disproportionate number of challenges against a particular group; the jurors excluded were as heterogeneous
as the community except for their race; and the party engaged in only desultory voir dire with
the excluded jurors. Id.
112. The Payne court stated as follows:
[Tlrial judges, given their presence in the court room during the entire proceeding
and their ability to observe all facets of the voir dire selection, their experience
with voir dire examinations, and the benefit of their judicial trial experience, should
be able to distinguish bona fide reasons for exclusion from contrived declarations
of motives.
106 II1. App. 3d at 1040 n.5, 436 N.E.2d at 1050 n.5.
113. Id. at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
114. Id. at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1051.
115. Id. at 1038-39, 436 N.E.2d at 1049.
116. Id. at 1036-38, 436 N.E.2d at 1048-50.
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procedures and the prosecution's legitimate, uncurtailed right to reject potentially biased jurors. Furthermore, in permitting judicial inquiry of the peremptory challenges in the context of a single trial, the Payne court summarily
contravened the policies underlying such challenges.
The premise relied upon in Payne is that the application of the sixth amendment to the states, and Taylor's cross-section representation requirement,
significantly changed the law as defined in Swain regarding the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges." 7 Quoting broad language from Taylor, the
Payne court held that the Taylor rationale requires a petit jury to be comprised of that cross-sectional composition which results from the random
draw. '" Taylor and its progeny, however, dealt only with state administered
selection procedures which exclude groups from the jury venires, not from
the petit jury.' ' Thus, in contrast to the Supreme Court's test for purposeful
systematic exclusion under the fourteenth amendment, the sixth amendment

117. Id. at 1042, 436 N.E.2d at 1052. In making this assertion, Payne relied on the Supreme
Court's statement that the sixth amendment right to a petit jury trial "made applicable to
the States . . .in Duncan v. Louisiana does not apply to state trials that took place before
the decision in Duncan." Id. (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 496 (1972) (citation omitted)). In Peters, the defendant, a white male, challenged a state statute which effectively excluded blacks from the petit jury. The Court made that statement in reference to the issue
of whether the defendant had standing to challenge the exclusion of a group of which he was
not a member. In holding that defendant had standing, the Peters Court examined the issue
under a due process, rather than an equal protection, analysis. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. at
501; see supra text accompanying notes 17-18. It is apparent, therefore, that the Court in
Peters was referring solely to the effect that incorporation of the sixth amendment had on
a defendant's standing to challenge a group's exclusion. Accordingly, the Peters Court did
not elaborate on the sixth amendment's effect on the defendant's right to cross-sectional
representation.
Since its decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), incorporating the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in state criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has cited repeatedly
to Swain as authority. See, e.g., University of Cal. Bd. of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
319 n.53 (1978) ("Universities, like the prosecutor in Swain, may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate
. . . purpose"); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972) (unanimous jury verdicts are
not a necessary condition precedent for effective application of the cross-section requirement;
reaffirming the Swain principle that only systematic exclusion is forbidden, and rejecting the
argument that lower minority participation would not adequately represent the viewpoint of
certain groups because they might be outvoted; see also Brief for Appellant at 9-12, People
v. Payne, No. 56907 (111.S. Ct. argued June 22, 1983).
118. 106 I1. App. 3d at 1035-37, 436 N.E.2d at 1047-48.
119. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), specifically noted that under the current fair cross-section analysis of the sixth amendment, the Court
was concerned more with vindicating the excluded classes' rights to participate in the administration of the judicial process than with seeking cross-sectional representation on the petit jury
itself. Id. at 371-72 n.* (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting); see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,
412-13 (1972) (the sixth amendment cross-section requirement protects a group's right to participate in the legal process, but does not give every group the right to be represented on a
particular petit jury). Compare Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (exclusion of women
under cross-sectional analysis of the sixth amendment); with Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)
(statutory exclusion of women under equal protection analysis).
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cross-sectional analysis has been limited to the venire composition. 2 0 Under
both the fourteenth and sixth amendments, group affiliation appears to be
only a means by which a court identifies the scope of the community's participation in the jury system.'' According to Swain and Taylor, the constitutional requirement of community participation under either the fourteenth or sixth amendment is satisfied when the venire represents a crosssection of the community, and when groups are not excluded systematically
from the petit jury.'

Swain authorized judicial review when systematic exclusion occurred in
case after case. Premised on the incorporation of the sixth amendment,
however, the Payne decision expanded the Swain standard by permitting

judicial review within the context of a single trial. Payne's interpretation
is unsound because although the cross-sectional analysis of the sixth amendment significantly alleviates the burden of establishing systematic exclusion,
the defendant still is required to establish that the underrepresentation of

120. The Court's limitation of the cross-sectional requirement may be explained by the administrative difficulties which would arise if no such limitation existed. The vagaries inherent
in a random draw selection scheme often result in the disproportionate representation of groups.
Challenges for cause also may result in an unrepresentative jury. To insure cross-sectional representation, a court would have to identify which groups need to be represented in order to implement an affirmative selection procedure that would make petit juries representative. See Saltzburg
and Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 347 n.47 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Sallzburg & Powers].
Any affirmative effort to create a proportionately representative jury, however, might increase the chances of jury manipulation and also be constitutionally impermissible. See Shepard
v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1951) (reversing a state court decision which upheld the selection of a grand jury on the basis of proportional representation). But cf. Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination of Guilt: The FairCross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 610 n.77 (1982) (arguing
that the cross-sectional analysis delineated in Taylor and Duren was confined to venires since
the Court did not need to analyze the issue, as it pertains to petit juries, in order to reach
its decision) [hereinafter cited as Colussi]. For a discussion of the problems with extending the
cross-sectional rule to petit juries, see Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups and Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1732 (1977).
121. See, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 33 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320, 322 (1970); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879); see also Note,
Discrete Groups, supra note 33, at 1212-13; Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1778-79. The
Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (Supp. 1982), states that "all citizens
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries." Id. § 1861
(emphasis added).
122. See supra note 121; see also People v. Hyche, 77 II1. 2d 229, 396 N.E.2d 6 (1979)
(right to a fair trial was not denied when veniremen served in co-defendant's venire); People
v. Connolly, 55 111.2d 421, 303 N.E.2d 409 (1973) (fair trial right not denied when no blacks
are on petit jury); People v. Joyner, 110 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 441 N.E.2d 1214 (4th Dist. 1982)
(exclusion of blue collar workers from venire does not violate the sixth amendment); People
v. Mitchell, 98 I11. App. 3d 398, 424 N.E.2d 658 (3d Dist. 1981) (defendant was not denied
the right to a fair trial when his trial was removed to an all white county); People v. Fernandez, 66 II1. App. 3d 103, 383 N.E.2d 663 (5th Dist. 1978) (the absence of Latinos on panel
and petit jury does not deny a defendant's right to a fair trial).
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the group has occurred over a period substantially longer than the context
of a single case.' 3 Thus, under either the fourteenth amendment analysis
of Swain or the sixth amendment cross-sectional analysis of Taylor and
Duren, inquiry into the reasons for exercising peremptory challenges should
be limited to the extreme situation in which the peremptory challenge has
been used consistently to exclude groups in a significant number of cases,
and not just within the particular case before the court.'" Unless a consistent underrepresentation is demonstrated, there should be no constitutional
violation.
This reasoning was followed recently by the Rhode Island Supreme Court

in State v. Raymond,'25 decided approximately one week after Payne. In

Raymond, the defendant claimed that the prosecution's use of peremptory

challenges to strike three young female jurors 2 ' from the venire denied
her the sixth amendment right to a trial by a representative cross-section
of the community. The Raymond court, focusing on Taylor, Duren, and

Swain, ruled that even under the sixth amendment cross-sectional analysis,
systematic exclusion through the use of 27
peremptory challenges must be
demonstrated on a case after case basis.

123. See supra note 45; see also Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981) (underrepresentation of individuals opposed to death penalty declared not cross-sectionally infirm);
United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.) (eight out of 15 cases held to be insufficient
systematic exclusion for either sixth or fourteenth amendment violation), cer. denied, 425 U.S.
961 (1975); State v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (five cases is an insufficient demonstration of systematic exclusion); Commonwealth v. Boykin, 276 Pa. Super. 56, 419
A.2d 92 (1980) (case after case demonstration is required by both the sixth and fourteenth
amendments).
124. See supra notes 45, 123. Swain's authorization of judicial control is limited specifically
to circumstances which indicate that the peremptory challenge has been used over a period
of time to exclude a racial group. It is only then, "giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial related suspicions and antagonisms it would appear that the purpose
of the peremptory [is] being perverted." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 223-24. At least one
court has held that even where such a case is demonstrated by the defendant the inquiry is
permitted only as to the attorney's conduct (i.e., questions regarding the number of cases in
which he exercised his challenges with the result that no black sat on the petit jury), and not
as to his thought processes and reasons for exercising his challenges. United States v. Pearson,
448 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1971).
125. R.I. , 446 A.2d 743 (1982).
126. Id. at __ , 446 A.2d at 745.
127. Although the defendant is entitled to a jury chosen from a cross-sectionally representative venire, "the fair cross-section requirement does not mean that the jury actually chosen
must reflect this cross-section." Id. The Raymond court further stated that the cause of the
underrepresentation must be systematic, rather than occasional, and that "[sluch a showing
[would be] virtually impossible with respect to the exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case." Id. at -, 446 A.2d at 745 n.3; see State v. Ucero, R.I. , 450 A.2d
809 (1982) (same court ruling that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
three male jurors does not justify inquiry into the reasons for such challenges); see also Hoskins
v. State, __ Ind. -, 441 N.E.2d 419 (1982) (the prosecution need not give reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges).
This line of precedent is difficult to reconcile with the Payne standard. The Payne court
found that when all blacks on the venire but one are excluded, such "token" representation
does not comply with the fair cross-section requirement. 106 11M.
App. 3d at 1045, 436 N.E.2d
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Focusing on the principles established by the Supreme Court under the
fourteenth and sixth amendments, it is apparent that contrary to the Payne
court's analysis, the incorporation of the sixth amendment's guarantee of
an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community has not
significantly changed federal constitutional law regarding the prosecution's
use of the peremptory challenge. Accepting Payne's ruling that logic compels the extension of Taylor's cross-sectional rationale' 28 to the petit jury,
it is still necessary under Taylor, Swain, and Duren for the court to find
that there has been a recurrent abuse of peremptory challenges.
An additional problem with the Payne court's curtailment of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges is that it does not adequately consider
the distinction between a group's right to be selected to participate in the
29
jury process, and the litigant's right to reject potentially partial jurors.'
The constitutional limitation imposed by the sixth amendment on pre-trial
selection procedures that are administered entirely by the state neither requires that petit juries be cross-sectionally representative, nor is it premised
on the belief that group representation assures the impartiality of the petit
jury.' 30 If group representation were a requisite for jury impartiality and

at 1054. It is uncertain whether such tokenism refers to the number of blacks impaneled or
the order in which they are impaneled. For example, if the state allows the first black to sit
and excludes the remaining blacks, it is likely, though not certain, that the Payne standard
would be violated. Additionally, if the prosecutor challenges the first few blacks, then allows
a black to sit and continues to strike the remaining blacks, it also is uncertain whether the
Payne standard would be violated.
128. Id. at 1036-37, 436 N.E.2d at 1048. The Payne court reasoned that the "very purpose
of refusing to tolerate racial discrimination in the composition of the venire [was] to prevent
. . . systematic exclusion of any racial group in the composition of the jury itself." Id. The
court further assert6d that since "[tihe desired goal of interaction of ... the community [did]
not occur within the venire but . . . by the petit jury," it logically followed that "systematic
exclusion of prospective jurors solely because of their race [was] equally invidious . . . at any
stage of the jury selection." Id.
129. See supra note 123 for cases cited therein; see also United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 480, 482 (1827) (peremptory challenge is a statutory right to reject, not to select);
State v. White, 622 S.W.2d 939 (Mo. 1981) (cross-sectional analysis is applicable only to selection, not rejection, procedures); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359-61; Saltzburg & Powers,
supra note 120, at 373. Once the legislature has granted the prosecution the right to reject
prospective jurors, it should be able to exercise that right equally with defendants. Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887); see also Stilson v. United States, 250 J.S. 583, 586 (1919)
(where prosecution has a greater number of peremptory challenges, the defendant's sixth amendment rights are not violated).
130. See Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32 (1975) (jury was fair even though it was not
cross-sectionally representative); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (although the Court
implied that impartiality was linked with cross-representation, it stated that it is not "necessary
to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class"); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1972) (rejecting the notion that the majority will decide a minority defendant's guilt on the basis of racial prejudice). In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 91 U.S. 510, 517-18
(1968), prospective jurors were challenged for cause because of their anti-death penalty views.
The Court held that exclusion of this group, and the resultant unrepresentative jury, had no
effect on the jury's impartiality in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. The
Witherspoon Court also implied that the fair cross-section requirement must not interfere with
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community participation, then a jury that lacks participation by certain
groups, as a result of the random draw, would be just as impartial as the

unrepresentative jury that is produced by the exercise of peremptory challenges.' 3' The purpose of the cross-sectional requirement is to assure that
various societal groups are given an opportunity to participate in the criminal
justice system.' 32 The state, absent significant justification,' 33 has no legitimate
interest in selecting which groups can participate in the jury system.
During the petit jury selection stage, however, the concern should shift
from an emphasis on cross-sectional selection procedures to a rejection process in which both parties eliminate those jurors who are most partial to
their opponent's case."' The peremptory challenge allows counsel to evaluate

the effect that certain portions of the trial may have on potential jurors,
and permits them to exclude people who they feel will be adverse to their
client.' 33 To the extent that the prosecutor rejects jurors on the basis of an
intuitive perception of potential partiality within the context of a single trial,
he is fulfilling his obligations as an advocate on behalf of the community

and the victim to secure a jury in which partiality against the state has been

minimized.' 36 Under Taylor and Duren, the constitutional proscription of

state selection procedures that result in systematic exclusion of certain groups
should not impose similar fair cross-section requirements that hinder counsel's

right to reject prospective jurors for perceived partiality.' 37 The cross-section
that remains after the rights of rejection have been exercised should be fair,
not representational, because "[a] cross-section of the fair and impartial is

traditional practices such as peremptory challenges. Id. at 530 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
also Colussi, supra note 120, at 604; Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1778.
131. See Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1778-80 (arguing that the fair cross-section requirement is an unsound basis for curtailing abuse of peremptory challenges); see also Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-38 (1975); see also supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1979); United States v. Beonmuhar,
658 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981) (the state has an interest in excluding those who cannot read or
understand English); United States v. Van Scoy, 654 F.2d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 1981) (the state
has an interest in excusing attorneys and doctors).
134. See Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The guarantee [of impartiality] cannot mean that the state must present its case to the jury least likely to convict");
People v. Gregory, 95 111. App. 2d 396, 411-18, 237 N.E.2d 720, 728-31 (1st Dist. 1968) (the
standard used in analyzing abuse of peremptory challenges differs from that used in determining systematic exclusion in state selection procedure); State v. White, 622 S.W.2d 939 (Mo.
1981) (cross-sectional analysis is applicable to state selection procedures, but not to an attorney's
right to reject); see also Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1780.
135. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
136. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (a prosecutor may prosecute vigorously
and can use every legitimate means to bring about a just conviction). For a thorough discussion of the ethical problems confronting the prosecutor, see Alderstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1978).
137. See cases cited supra note 123.
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more desirable than a fair cross-section of the prejudiced and biased."' 38
The policies which support an uncurtailed right to reject within a trial,
however, become inapplicable when it is apparent that in case after case,
regardless of the circumstances, a pattern of discriminatory underrepresentation of a cognizable group is demonstrated. The prosecutor, rather than
exercising a statutorily granted right to reject, is carrying out an affirmative
policy of the state's attorney's office to select juries which exclude particular
groups. In doing so, the peremptory challenge is transformed into a selection procedure whereby the state's attorney's office violates the duty imposed
on the state by the sixth amendment.' 39 It is only at this point' ° that the
attorney violates his ethical duty to seek justice, and the constitutional limitations of the sixth amendment concerning jury selection procedures should
be imposed to curtail the abuse of the peremptory challenge.
138. Smith v. Balckom, 660 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1981) (the cross-sectional character of
the jury must yield to the state's interest in an impartial jury when prospective jurors who
are unalterably opposed to the death penalty are challenged for cause).
139. See, e.g., Schultz v. Gilbert, 300 Ill. App. 417, 20 N.E.2d 884 (4th Dist. 1939) (a peremptory challenge is a right to reject, and not to select, jurors); State v. White, 622 S.W.2d 939,
940 (Mo. 1981) (the cross-sectional representation requirement of the sixth amendment is not
applicable to rejection of jurors through peremptory challenges); see also cases cited supra note
121.
140. One criticism of the Swain "case after case" standard for proving prosecutorial abuse
of peremptory challenges is its failure to provide a remedy for the defendants in those cases
which established a systematic pattern of exclusion. These defendants, however, also have suffered violations of their sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. This criticism is not without
merit. Nevertheless, there are means by which these defendants may be granted relief. When
material evidence is discovered after trial, which with due diligence could not have been discovered
before trial, it can be used as a basis for a new trial if it is likely to change the result upon
retrial. See People v. Pavic, 104 Ill. App. 3d 436, 450-51, 432 N.E.2d '074, 1085 (1st Dist.
1982) (articulating criteria for determining whether evidence is newly discovered); see also People v. Freeman, 26 I1. App. 3d 443, 446-47, 326 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1st Dist. 1975) (newly
discovered evidence can be used as a basis for a new trial).
Nevertheless, courts may be hesitant to grant relief in the form of a new trial because it
cannot be established, with any degree of certainty, that the existence of systematic exclusion
had any effect on the outcome of the case. See People v. Rogers, 375 Ill. 54, 30 N.E.2d 77
(1940). An alternative approach is to provide relief through a writ of habeas corpus.
The Illinois habeas corpus statute provides that a prisoner in legal custody can be discharged
"[wlhere, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet, by some act, omission or event
which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to his discharge." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 65, § 22 (1981). Since constitutional violations or errors of fact may be remedied
by a writ of habeas corpus, evidence that the prosecution systematically excluded blacks in
violation of defendant's constitutional rights could be construed as a basis for discharging the
defendant. See People v. Freeman, 26 Ill. App. 3d 443, 326 N.E.2d 207 (lst Dist. 1975). Providing the defendant with this form of collateral relief is likely to have a greater effect in
deterring prosecutors from abusing their peremptory challenges than would requiring prosecutors
to justify their challenges within the context of a single trial. For examples of events subsequent to conviction that entitle a prisoner to habeas corpus relief, see People ex rel. Castle
v. Spivey, 10 111.2d 586, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957) (serving more than the maximum sentence);
People ex rel. Lowe v. Ragen, 387 I11. 131, 55 N.E.2d 83 (1944) (prison transfer without a
hearing); People ex rel. Titzel v. Hill, 344 111.246, 176 N.E. 360 (1931) (prisoner satisfied
judgment under which he was imprisoned).
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A peremptory challenge, unlike a challenge for cause,"4' permits an attorney to reject prospective jurors during pre-trial voir dire for any reason,
or for no reason at all. The peremptory challenge allows the attorney to reject
prospective jurors whom he believes to be partial when, due to the inherent
limitations of the voir dire process, he is unable to gather sufficient evidence
to establish a challenge for cause.' 2 Furthermore, the peremptory challenge
promotes the function of challenges for cause by allowing the attorney to
remove those jurors he may have antagonized during questioning in an attempt to highlight biases.' 3 The peremptory challenge also guarantees not
only that the jury is comprised of fair-minded jurors, but that the jury's
partiality has been minimized to counsel's satisfaction. " Because racial,
religious, and sexual prejudices are an extremely sensitive subject, judges
might be hesitant to strike a juror for cause on this basis, even though the
answers given during voir dire suggest a possibility of bias.' 5 Use of the
peremptory challenge to strike persons with prejudices adverse to a particular
side, which happen to be shared by a cognizable group, avoids the possibility
of a judicial ruling which sanctions the imputation of bias arising from an
individual's group membership.' 6 The Constitution permits peremptory
challenges to be exercised because of the litigant's rational or irrational belief
47
that certain group associations indicate partiality.'
The Payne court, in subjecting the peremptory challenges of a single trial
to judicial inquiry, has substantially undermined the purpose and policies
underlying the challenge. The prosecutor faced with the Payne limitation
141. See infra note 148.
142. In Illinois, the voir dire process is conducted by the courts which, in their discretion,
may permit parties to submit additional questions or supplement the judge's questions with
direct examination. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, §§ 234, 431 (1981). For a discussion of
the hearings concerning this matter, see Rolewick, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: A Brief
Study of the Action of the Illinois Judicial Conference in Recommending Revision in the Supreme
Court Rule 234, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 50 (1975). The right to trial by jury does not include
the right to conduct voir dire questioning. See People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 260, 371
N.E.2d 602, 606 (1977); People v. Brumfield, 51 111. App. 3d 637, 644-45, 366 N.E.2d 1130,
1133-34 (3d Dist. 1977). Because judges generally are hostile to extensive voir dire, the attorney's ability to elicit unconscious bias is curtailed severely. See, e.g., People v. Delordo,
350 Ill. 118, 182 N.E. 726 (1932) (only failure to permit inquiries which would constitute a
basis for a challenge for cause is reversible error). Accordingly, many commentators have called
for the expansion of the voir dire process to aid in eliciting unconscious bias. See generally,
Babcock, Voir Dire. Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Babcock]; Norman, The Supreme Court Rule Governing Jury Selection, 67 ILL. B.J.
152 (1978); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitatethe Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Minimum].
143. See supra note 132; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965) (peremptory challenge permits detailed questioning during voir dire and removes the fear of incurring
juror hostility resulting from the questioning).
144. See Note, Minimum, supra note 142, at 1502-04.
145. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 545, 443 N.E.2d 915, 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
146. See Babcock, supra note 142, at 553; see also Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1782.
147. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965).
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on his peremptory challenges may be reluctant to engage in a thorough in-

quiry during voir dire. In attempting to establish the specific bias required
for a challenge for cause,' 48 the prosecutor may not want to risk antagoniz-

ing a member of a racial group if he knows that the court could void' 9
his peremptory challenge of that individual on the basis that the challenge
was exercised out of group bias.' 50

Payne emphasizes the importance of cross-sectional representation over
the goal of impartiality, and as a result, introduces a novel perspective of

the jury's function.'' The court's goal of preserving cross-sectonal representation on the petit jury implies that individual jurors hold biases, derived
from their group memberships, which will be asserted vigorously in the course
of jury deliberation.' 2 Thus, a diverse jury is needed to balance these potential group biases. This focus, however, ignores the fact that biases frequently
148. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 14 (1981) (statutory grounds requisite for a challenge
for cause). The grounds for challenges for cause have been limited to eliminating admitted
bias or bias which clearly is implied from the prospective juror's connection with the case.
Note Minimum, supra note 142, at 1500. For cases demonstrating limited bases for challenges
for cause, see United States v. Cross, 474 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1973) (challenge for cause was
not allowed where prospective juror stated that he would give more credibility to an FBI agent
than to any other witness); Bateman v. United States, 212 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1954) (juror's
prejudice against the defense attorney was not a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause).
149. The remedy articulated in Payne is that the court "must dismiss the jurors thus far
selected . . . [and] it must quash the remaining venire." 106 111.App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d
at 1050-51 (emphasis added). One Massachusetts court following the Soares standard, which
requires a similar remedy, see supra notes 75-77, 113-14 and accompanying text, has ruled
that dismissal of the venire is not the only appropriate relief. In Commonwealth v. Reid, 1981
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1803, 424 N.E.2d 495 (1981), defendant exercised her peremptory
challenges to exclude all of the prospective male jurors in the venire. The prosecution moved
to dismiss the jurors already selected, quash the remaining venire, and have a new venire
selected. Id. at __ , 424 N.E.2d at 500. The judge denied the motion and held that the appropriate remedy was to disallow the challenges and permit the challenged individuals to be
seated. Id. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court, stating that the remedy
outlined in Soares did not preclude judges from using other means in order to implement the
Soares holding. Id. The court further reasoned that limiting trial judges to the specific remedy
outlined in Soares would provide an opportunity for the parties to have mistrials declared because
of their own misconduct. Id.
150. See Note, .4 New Standard for Peremptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 189, 199 (1979) (criticizing the Wheeler standard for its emphasis on a group's right
to serve on juries at the expense of the parties' right to an impartial jury) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Standard]. Moreover, limiting the peremptory challenge to circumstances of specific
bias faced within a single case might force counsel to accept individuals who are on the extreme edge of partiality, because the exclusion of those prospective jurors through peremptories would result in an unrepresentative jury. As a result, the Payne ruling, by focusing on
a group's participation in the jury system, grants a group the right to remain on the jury
even though the litigants subtly may perceive potential partiality, but are unable to demonstrate
sufficiently that partiality to the judge's satisfaction. See supra notes 142, 148; see also People
v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 545, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
151. See Note, Discrete Groups, supra note 33, at 1215-19.
152. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 369-72; Note, Discrete Groups, supra note
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overlap. By implying that these unconscious biases must balance, the Payne
court provides judicial recognition that prejudices may so dominate jurors
that they are controlled by their biases, incapable of viewing the evidence
as dispassionate finders of fact.' 53 This judicial recognition of unconscious
bias is precisely what the peremptory challenge seeks to avoid. Individuals,
now cognizant that prejudices affect their deliberations, may read the court's
recognition of these biases as a mandate to assert their prejudices, rather
than attempt to set them aside in reviewing the evidence presented.' 54 As
a result, the goal of achieving an impartial jury could become more difficult
under the Payne standard.
IMPACT

The ultimate result of Payne is that if peremptory challenges can be exercised only in a certain way, dependent upon circumstances and subject to
judicial scrutiny, they will no longer be peremptory. Furthermore, the Payne
decision creates a standard which provides little direction for judges to follow
in determining the validity of the prosecution's motives for exercising its
peremptory challenges. As a result, several practical procedural problems arise.
The initia problem with the Payne standard lies in determining the point
at which it "reasonably appears" that there is an unconstitutional systematic
exclusion of a group. 55' The Payne court maintains that under its approach,
the Illinois statute providing for peremptory challenges is invalid only when

it is applied unconstitutionally. In practice, however, the Payne standard
33, at 1212; Note, Misuse, supra note 108, at 1778-82; Note, Peremptory Challenges and the
Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177, 1185-89 (1980).
153. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 290-93, 583 P.2d at 771-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13; see also
Frederick, Jury Behavior: A Psychologist Examines Jury Selection, 5 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 571
(1978) (review of demographic and psychological characteristics that may influence a juror's
decision, and techniques used by social scientists to assist in jury selection).
Requiring that jurors' biases balance presumes that society is divided into a majority and
a minority which are in absolute conflict with each other, and that the elimination of one
biased juror results in a replacement that is reciprocally biased. Saltzburg & Powers, supra
note 120, at 369-72. Such a presumption is disputed:
The real and realistic aim of our jury selection method is not to achieve the impossible complete impartiality but rather to minimize the range of predispositions
that may influence the jury's verdict. Conceptually, we can rank the members of
a jury venire in a spectrum from those most predisposed toward the plaintiff to
those most predisposed toward the defendant.
GINGER, supra note 21, § 7.15, at 281 (quoting Affidavit of H. Zeisel, In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Action (D. Minn., No. 4-71, Civ. 435, pending)).
154. The detection of unconscious prejudice is too intuitive and subjective to impose a judicial
pronouncement that an individual may be unfit to serve in a particular case. Note, Minimum,
supra note 142, at 1495. Peremptory challenges permit parties to determine biases based on
societal characteristics which ordinarliy would not be acknowledged in the context of a challenge
for cause. See Babcock, supra note 142, at 553; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 356.
155. See Decker, Some Thoughts on People v. Payne: Arguments in Opposition to Payne,
13 ILL. CTS. BULL. JutD. AD. (111.St. B.A.) No. 2, at 8 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Decker].
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would invalidate the statute whenever there is a "reasonable appearance"
that the peremptory challenges were exercised to exclude group biases from
the jury." 6 For example, when there are only two blacks on the venire
and the prosecution strikes one with its peremptory challenge, it is uncertain
whether this striking of fifty percent of the black representation would
"reasonably appear" to constitute systematic exclusion. Furthermore, should
the defendant decide to dppeal an adverse ruling by the trial court, the fact
that the excluded jurors may have subtly conveyed hostility to the prosecutor,
thereby indicating a potential for partiality, would not appear in the record
before the appellate court.'5 7 Thus, there is a tremendous potential that many
of the prosecution's peremptory challenges, legitimate even under the Payne
standard, will be incorporated under the rubric of "reasonably appears."
Consequently, the state will be forced to forfeit its statutory right to an
uncurtailed use of peremptory challenges whenever it is accused of misusing
that right as a tool of racial discrimination, and such an accusation impresses
the trial court as having merely a "reasonable appearance" of being true.'"
Rather than forfeit the right to exercise his peremptory challenges, counsel
faced with curtailed challenges simply will risk the judicial inquiry. Even
more disturbing, however, is the possibility that when it would be to the
prosecution's advantage, the prosecution may use its challenges in order to
have the venire quashed and the selection process repeated.' 5
A second problem with the Payne standard is that the meaning of
"systematic exclusion" is left to the "trial judge's experience."' 6" Other courts
that have considered this question have determined that no systematic exclusion exists when the defense has used its peremptory challenges to strike
minorities.' 6' Courts also have ruled that where there are any other circumstances which explain the dismissal of blacks,' 6 1 or where there is evidence

156. See People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 114-15, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 757 (1981) (Mangano,
J., dissenting) (rejecting the proposition that the statute granting peremptory challenges is invalidated only when applied unconstitutionally).
157. See supra note 155.
158. Id.
159. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1803, 424 N.E.2d 49.5 (1981) (discussing
potential abuse of the Soares standard and holding that dismissal of venire is not the only
remedy; rather, judges may disallow the peremptory challenge and allow the juror to sit).
160. 106 111.
App. 3d at 1040 n.5, 436 N.E.2d at 1050'n.5; see Commonwealth v. DiMatteo,
1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1777, 427 N.E.2d 754 (1981) (holding that where a defendant
strikes the only black on the venire, a "pattern" of conduct is not required for the prosecution
to succeed on a Soares challenge).
161. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 922 (D. Md. 1973) (co-defendant's
exercise of peremptory challenges to obtain an all white jury did not constitute prejudice to
the defendant). For a thorough survey of the case law regarding the use of peremptory challenges
to exclude groups from the jury, see Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.) (statistics used were inappropriate to determine whether systematic exclusion occurred), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976);
United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting statistical evidence as being
clearly indicative of systematic exclusion in the county where a court sits); McKinney v. Walker,
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that blacks actually served on a petit jury, systematic exclusion does not
exist.' 63 With this precedent, and the failure to delineate any factors the trial
judge is to consider, Payne's individual case standard offers little to assist
trial judges in reaching a decision.
While condemning the use of group classifications as a proxy for predicting potential bias, the Payne court, unlike the court in Soares, failed to
articulate what is meant by "discrete groups."' 64 Payne explicitly mentioned
that Jews, Mexicans, Italians, and women would constitute such groups for
purposes of its standard.' 6 Focusing on these examples, there appear to be
two distinct analyses used in determining whether a group is discrete. First,
a group may be classified as discrete if its members possess biases which
result from their association with a particular societal subgroup.' 66 This
analysis would justify categorizing blacks, hispanics, and women as discrete.
Alternatively, discrete status could be conferred on those who, because of
their shared beliefs and biases, constitute a homogeneous group. 1 7 Under
394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C.) (defects in the drawing of venire and the exercise of peremptory
challenges which resulted in the absence of blacks from the jury was not systematic exclusion),
aff'd without opinion, 529 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1974). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977).
163. See, e.g., United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974) (the fact
that blacks served on juries in a lesser percentage than they appeared on voter registration
lists was constitutionally permissible); State v. Gray, 285 So. 2d 199 (La. 1973) (the fact that
blacks were represented on the jury in a lesser percentage than other groups as a result of
the prosecution's peremptory challenges was not systematic exclusion), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
774 (1975); State v. Booker, 517 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (the fact that blacks sat
on 32% of trials involving black defendants was not systematic exclusion); Ridley v. State,
475 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (the fact that all but three blacks on the venire were
excused through the use of peremptory challenges was not systematic exclusion). See generally
Annot., 79 A.L.R.3d 14 (1977).
164. The Payne court stated that group classifications never are acceptable proxies for determining potential bias; however:
Whatever it is about group associations that suggests that members of one group
are somehow different from non-members also suggests that any differences might
include a greater likelihood of certain shared feelings, which might imply partiality
in some instances. If so, a challenge would be made to all members of the group
precisely because they share special feelings.
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 360. These "special feelings" may create prejudice
in a particular case.
The Wheeler court, in making a distinction between impermissible group bias based peremptory challenges and permissible specific bias based challenges, stated that where the prosecutor
challenges those who have a prior arrest record, have complained of police harassment, have
"unconventional" hairstyles or lifestyles, or smile, gesture or look a certain way, such challenges
are permissible. In each of these examples, however, as in the case of racial stereotypes, bias
is still being presumed from a prospective juror's membership in a group. People v. Wheeler,
22 Cal. 3d at 776, 583 P.2d at 760, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
165. 106 Il. App. 3d at 1037 n.2, 436 N.E.2d at 1048 n.2.
166. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
167. See People v. Benard, 129 Cal. App. 3d 833, 181 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1982) (individuals
unalterably opposed to the death penalty are not a cognizable group); Rubio v. Superior Court,
24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979) (ex-felons and non-resident aliens are
not a discrete group because others can represent their perspectives adequately); People v. Kagan,
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this analysis religious groups such as Jews, Catholics, and Protestants would
constitute discrete groups. Applying either approach, it certainly can be

asserted that young adults, Republicans, Democrats, Nazis, Ku Klux Klan
members, married or single individuals, and the elderly would constitute
discrete groups. Under either analysis, the potential harm of the Payne standard is unlimited.' As courts gradually recognize more groups as being
"discrete," the utility of peremptory challenges in excluding perceived biases
will be practically destroyed.
An additional problem with the Payne standard is that the prosecution's

task of establishing the validity of its peremptory challenges is unclear and
may burden the voir dire process." 9 By subjecting the peremptory challenge
to judicial inquiry, Payne requires that an attorney gather objective evidence
in order to prove that his challenges are being exercised to eliminate group
members who harbor biases specific to the case. To accomplish this, it is

likely that the prosecutor will turn to the voir dire process. Because voir
dire is designed only to reveal the narrow bias requisite to establish a challenge
for cause, 7 ' it rarely is used to reveal more general biases or prejudices.
Therefore, the added necessity of justifying peremptory challenges may result

in an excessive burden that voir dire is not designed to handle.' 7 ' The more
likely result, however, is that judges, many of whom feel that the voir dire
process is already too burdensome, may refuse a prosecutor's request to ex-

pand the questioning of jurors so that the state can establish that an individual does in fact harbor some specific bias to the case.' 72 Consequently,
under the Payne standard, the prosecution could be curtailed both in the
use of its pereinptory challenges and in its attempt to establish the validity
of such challenges.
Assuming that a judge does not limit counsel's questioning during voir
dire, it is doubtful that extensive questioning would effectively reveal grounds
sufficient to constitute specific bias because jurors probably will be unaware
of their biases or reluctant to answer truthfully.'7 3 The Payne ruling will

101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S. 2d 987 (1979) (systematic exclusion of Jews on the basis of
their ethnic affiliations and shared beliefs deprives a Jewish defendant of the right to a trial
by his peers).
168. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 367-72; Decker, supra note 155, at 9.
169. See supra note 129. "To the extent that restrictions on a party's exercise of the peremptory challenge would require more extensive voir dire . . . [limiting peremptory challenges]
would invite . . . additional delay at trial which our justice system can ill afford." People
v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 546, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983); see also Spence, Voir Dire: Guaranteed Right to Fair and Impartial
Jury, 56 FLA. B.J. 304 (1982) (demonstrating the fallacy behind the argument that restricted
voir dire saves time); Note, Standard, supra note 150, at 205.
170. See supra notes 132, 148.
171. See Note, Discrete Groups, supra note 33, at 1212-15.
172. See supra note 132.
173. See People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 545-46, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918-19, 457 N.Y.S.2d
441, 444-45 (1982) (voir dire is inadequate to filter out potential biases); Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 510 (1965); Saltzburg & Powers,
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place counsel in the precarious position of either attempting to highlight any
bias through further inquiry while risking alienation of the jurors, or exercising his peremptory challenges while risking an adverse finding by the trial
judge. The more likely result is that attorneys will circumvent the standard
by developing the ability to provide legitimate responses to judicial inquiry,
thereby rationalizing the true motive behind their challenge. 7 '
The Payne court, in its attempt to insure community participation in the
jury system, offers little guidance for the trial judge who must determine
when the prosecution is exercising its peremptory challenges to exclude a
societal group systematically. Prosecutors faced with allegations that they
are sexist, anti-Semitic, or racist, and confused as to how many peremptory
challenges are "too many," may abandon their use completely.' The defendant, on the other hand, will still be able to exercise his peremptory challenges
unhindered by any group or specific bias limitations. If this occurs, it hardly
could be said that between the state and the defendant the "scales are
evenly held" when these parties attempt to obtain a jury that they perceive
to be impartial.' 76
ALTERNATIVES

The major reason that a significant number of defendants fail to establish
systematic exclusion of cognizable groups under Swain is that there is a
lack of objective evidence of case after case abuse.' As a result, many commentators view the Wheeler-Soares standard as being the only practical solution to prevent discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.' 8 Although the
problem occurs in the courtroom,' 79 the solution does not lie in establishing
a vague constitutional rule of law. Rather, exercising their supervisory powers,

supra note 120, at 355, 360-63; see also People v. Oliver, 50 Ill. App. 3d 665, 365 N.E.2d
618 (1st Dist. 1977) (example of prospective juror misleading the defendant by falsely denying
any preconceived opinion of guilt).
174. See Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LITIGATION 23, 24 (1980); see also
People v. Johnson, 22 Cal. 3d 296, 583 P.2d 774, 148 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1978) (racially inflammatory testimony by the principal government witness was an insufficient justification for exclusion of blacks by use of peremptory challenges); Commonwealth v. Little, 81 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 1818, 424 N.E.2d 504 (1981) (prevailing racial tensions held to be an insufficient justification); Commonwealth v. Smith, 81 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1920, 428 N.E.2d 348 (1981)
(individual's participation on previous jury was a sufficient justification for exclusion); Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 238, 416 N.E.2d 218 (1981) (the prosecution's response that it excluded minorities in retaliation for the defendant's exclusion of whites
held to be an insufficient justification).
175. Decker, supra note 155, at 10.
176. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
177. See GINGER, supra note 21, at 443-76; PROJECT, supra note 46, at 15-40.
178. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 338 n.8; Note, Misuse, supra note 108,
at 1777-80.
179. People v. Gosberry, 109 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678-80, 440 N.E.2d 954, 959-60 (1st Dist.
1982). The courts also have contributed to the defendant's burden by rationalizing blatant examples of case after case discrimination. In United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976), the defendant demonstrated that in 15 cases a total
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the courts should implement internal procedures and have their clerks main-

tain records of the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges. Such
a record of discriminatory misuse will enable defendants to prove more easily
that some prosecutors use their challenges to eliminate minority participa-

tion systematically in the administration of justice.' 0 The courts, by
establishing an adequate and objective record, will enable defendants to meet
the requirements of Taylor and Swain, and will avoid a subjective, ad hoc

inquiry into the reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.
The legislature, as well as the courts, should listen to the message sent
by Payne. That. is, the Illinois legislature should reassess the propriety of
the prosecution's peremptory challenges in light of the fairness to the defense

and potential for abuse. Various legislative alternatives to increase minority
representation on the petit jury have been proposed. These generally consist
of coordinated programs which use additional source lists,'"' implementing
random selection procedures,' 2 curtailing exemptions,' 3 and improving the
administrative efficiency of the jury system."' Some commentators advocate

a reduction in the number of peremptory challenges in order to prevent
manipulation of the jury's composition.' 85 Others have proposed the absolute
elimination of prosecutorial challenges.' 86 These alternatives, which seek to

increase minority representation through improved jury selection procedures,
and which limit the potential abuse of the peremptory challenge without altering its fundamental nature, are superior to the vague standard set forth in
Payne which transforms a challenge "for no cause" into a challenge "for
no impermissible cause."
Legislatures, however, have been slow to adopt any of these proposals.
For example, in 1974 a bill was introduced in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives which would have eliminated all peremptory challenges.' 87
Although supported by the Massachusetts Bar Association, on the condition

that attorneys conduct the questioning during voir dire, the bill did not

of 70 blacks were on the venire; 57, or 81% were stricken by the prosecution. In the fifteenth
case, the government excluded all the prospective black jurors through the exercise of its peremptory challenges. Despite this evidence, the Carter court concluded that there was no Swain
violation. For other examples of judicial unwillingness to find a Swain violation despite a substantial showing of case after case abuse, see VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 155-56.
180. It may be true that this is an "open secret." See generally Waltz, supra note 105.
181. See Kuhn, supra note 27, at 255 (proposal to make source list truly representative of
the community); Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (suggesting
redistricting in order to obtain more representative source lists).
182. See VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 85-106; Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 374-76.
183. See VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 111-34.
184. Id. at 219-24.
185. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 120, at 376-80.
186. See VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 167; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a
Democratic Institution, 6 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 247, 269 (1973); Comment, Curbing Prosecutorial
Abuse of Peremptory Challenges-the Available Alternatives, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 223,
245-46 (1980).
187. For a discussion of this bill, see VAN DYKE, supra note 20, at 168-69.
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pass."' Similarly, in 1976 a proposal by the United States Supreme Court8 9
which would have reduced the number of peremptory challenges available
to both the prosecution and defendants was rejected by Congress.' 9 Although
neither of these bills became law, the fact that some legislatures have begun
to reexamine the propriety of peremptory challenges, coupled with the express judicial dissatisfaction with the abuse of such challenges, as evidenced
by Payne, should send a message to the Illinois legislature that a reevaluation of the policies, principles, and function of this device is clearly warranted.
It is apparent that the intent behind Payne is to impose judicial control
over alleged prosecutorial abuse of peremptory challenges. A reasonable
legislative compromise would be to divide the total number of peremptory
challenges the prosecution may exercise into two equal categories. The prosecution would be given total discretion in exercising the challenges in the
first category. These challenges would be exercised without the threat of being
required to show justification. The second category of peremptory challenges,
however, could be withheld by the trial judge if he observed that the prosecution was acting "improperly."' 9 The Payne "reasonably appears" standard could be used to determine whether to dispense the remaining peremptory
challenges, rather than as a basis to decide when the judge should inquire
into the reasons behind exercise of the challenges. By allowing the judge to
withhold only the second category of challenges, inquiry into the first category
of peremptory challenges would be eliminated and the total exclusion of a
cognizable group from participation on the petit jury would be prevented.
The effect would be to preserve the integrity of the premptory challenge while
simultaneously permitting judicial intervention where it is warranted.
CONCLUSION

The Payne decision may have a significant impact on both the propriety
of exercising peremptory challenges and the prosecution's ability to achieve
a fair and impartial jury. No one would accept the use of the peremptory
challenge as a means of effectuating a discriminatory selection procedure on
a case after case basis. Within the context of a single trial, however, the
attorney's uncurtailed right to reject those he intuitively perceives to be partial should outweigh an individual's right to participate on any particular jury.

188. See

VAN DYKE,

supra note 20, at 169.

H.R. Doc. No. 464, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1976). The Supreme Court proposed reduction of peremptory challenges from 20
to 12 in capital cases, from 6 (for government) and 10 (for defense) to 5 each in felony cases,
and from 3 to 2 in misdemeanor cases. Id. at 12-13 (App. A).
190. Act of July 30, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 2(c), 91 Stat. 319; see Note, Misuse, supra
note 108, at 1774-75 nn.37-43 (extensive discussion of this act).
191. The court would observe whether a prosecutor has struck all or most of the members
of a particular group, whether a disproportionate number of challenges have been exercised
against a particular group, and whether the prosecution engaged in more than desultory voir
dire. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
189. U.S. SUPREME COURT, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCurnuR,
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In'Swain, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of an uncurtailed
exercise of the peremptory challenge. Even under the fair cross-section analysis
of the sixth amendment established in Taylor and Duren, a case after case
demonstration of underrepresentation is required to determine if a group's
right to participate in the jury system has been denied.
Subjecting peremptory challenges to judicial inquiry within the context of
a single trial undermines the policies upon which the peremptory challenge is
based. The prosecutor, uncertain as to whether his peremptory challenges
may be ruled invalid, might be hesitant to engage in thorough questioning
during voir dire for fear that failure to establish a challenge for cause would
result in the impaneling of a hostile juror. Furthermore, judicial recognition of
the important role that group biases play in determining a jury's impartiality
may encourage individuals to assert their prejudices in deliberations, rather
than to set them aside and impartially review the evidence before them.
Instead of implementing an impractical rule of law, the courts should take
the initiative by establishing a record of the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges from which defendants may prove discriminatory misuse of the
device. Moreover, in protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial, courts
should be more liberal in holding that a defendant has established a case
after case claim of systematic exclusion. Finally, the legislature should reassess
the necessity of the peremptory challenge and impose some method of control in order to prevent potential misuse of the challenge as a jury selection
procedure.*
Kevin J. Cawley
* Subsequent to submission of this Note for publication, the Illinois Supreme Court granted

petitioner's leave to appeal and heard oral arguments on Payne. People v. Payne, No. 56907
(111.S. Ct. argued June 22, 1983). Although final resolution of Payne is pending, in two cases
decided after Payne, the court refused to extend the sixth amendment requirement of crosssectional representation to the petit jury. Without citation to Payne, the court in People v.
Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353 (1983), stated that it was not prepared to abandon the
case after case standard. Id. at 16-17, 447 N.E.2d at 360.
More recently, in People v. Williams, No. 53240 (Il. S. Ct. May 22, 1983), the court specifically
rejected the Payne court's conclusion that the cross-sectional representation requirement established
by the United States Supreme Court had changed federal constitutional law significantly. Id.
at 11-13. Noting that Payne "did not satisfactorily meet the questions which must be addressed
in considering the problem," the court found that there was "no retreat . . . from the view
that it is an essential part of our system of trial by an impartial jury that both sides be allowed
in particular cases to exercise peremptory challenges on any ground they select." Id. at 11, 14.
These two decisions assume additional significance in light of the United States Supreme
Court's recent refusal, in McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983), to review a New
York Court of Appeals decision which held that in order to establish systematic exclusion,
the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges
resulted in a case after case exclusion of blacks. See People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443
N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982). By refusing to consider whether the Constitution prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group from the
jury, the Court has deferred consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of
the problem until other state and federal courts clarify the issues. McCray, 103 S. Ct. at 2438-Ed.

